Post-1980 U.S. data trace out a stable long-run money demand relationship of Cagan's semi-log form between the M1-income ratio and the nominal interest rate, with an interest semi-elasticity of 1.79. Integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare cost of modest departures from Friedman's zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small. The results suggest that the Federal Reserve's current policy, which generates low but still positive rates of inflation, provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to the Friedman rule.
1 On the Welfare Cost of Inflation ... Inflation, brought under control in the early eighties, remains subdued today. Still, the question remains: what cost does the Federal Reserve's well-established policy of low but positive inflation impose on the economy, when compared to the optimal monetary policy prescribed by Friedman (1969) , which calls for a deflation that makes the nominal interest rate equal to zero? Lucas (2000) , working in the tradition of Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) , addresses this question directly. Lucas' analysis juxtaposes two competing specifications for money demand. One, inspired by Meltzer (1963) , relates the natural logarithm of m, the ratio of nominal money balances to nominal income, to the natural logarithm of r, the short-term nominal interest rate, according to ln(m) = ln(A) − η ln(r)
where A > 0 is a constant and η > 0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity of money demand. The other, adapted from Cagan (1956) , links the log of m instead to the level of r via ln(m) = ln(B) − ξr,
where B > 0 is a constant and ξ > 0 measures the absolute value of the interest semielasticity of money demand. Figure 1 plots the log-log demand curve (1) and the semi-log demand curve (2) on the same graph, where the axes measure both m and r in levels. Lucas' (2000) preferred specifications set η = 0.5 in (1) and ξ = 7 in (2), then pin down the constants A = 0.0488 and B = 0.3548 so that ln(A) equals the average value of ln(m) + η ln(r) and ln(B) equals the average value of ln(m) + ξr in annual U. S. data, 1900-1994 . These same settings determine the curvature and horizontal placement of the two curves in Figure 1 .
The graph highlights how (1) and (2) describe very different money demand behavior at low interest rates: as r approaches zero, (1) implies that real balances become arbitrarily large, while (2) implies that real balances reach the finite satiation point B when expressed as a fraction of real income. Hence, as emphasized by Lucas (2000) , these competing money demand specifications also have very different implications for the welfare cost of modest departures from Friedman's (1969) zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money. Bailey's (1956) traditional approach measures this welfare cost by integrating under the money demand curve as the interest rate rises from zero to r > 0 to find the lost consumer surplus then subtracting off the seigniorage revenue rm to isolate the deadweight loss. Let w(r) denote this welfare-cost measure, expressed as a function of r. Lucas (2000) shows that
when money demand takes the log-log form (1) and
when money demand takes the semi-log form (2). If, as assumed by Lucas, the steadystate real interest rate equals three percent, so that r = 0.03 prevails under a policy of zero inflation or price stability, then (3) and (4) imply that this policy costs the economy the equivalent of 0.85 percent of income when money demand is log-log, but only 0.10 percent of income when money demand has the semi-log form. Likewise, an ongoing two percent inflation costs the economy 1.09 percent of income under (1) and (3), but only 0.25 percent of income under (2) and (4).
These calculations underscore the importance of discerning the appropriate form of the money demand function before evaluating alternative monetary policies, including those that generate very low but still positive rates of inflation. Hence, Figure 1 also plots U.S.
data on the money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate, from an annual sample extending from 1900 through 1994 that is constructed, as described below in the Appendix, to resemble closely the one used by Lucas (2000) . Following Lucas, m is measured by dividing the M1 money stock by nominal GDP and r is measured by the six-month commercial paper rate. Based on the same comparison between these data and the plots of (1) and (2) shown in Figure 1 , Lucas concludes that the log-log specification provides a better fit, and thereby argues implicitly that the Federal Reserve could secure a substantial welfare gain for American consumers by abandoning its current, low-but-positive inflation policy and adopting the Friedman rule instead.
An important caveat to Lucas' (2000) argument arises, however, once one recognizes that the log-log specification appears to deliver a significantly better fit in Figure rates, suggesting that the semi-log specification (2) with its finite satiation point may now provide a more accurate description of money demand. Futhermore, the new data points appear to trace out a demand curve that is far less interest-elastic than either of the two curves drawn in to track the earlier data from Figure 1 . Both of these shifts, in functional form and towards a lower elasticity or semi-elasticity, work to reduce Lucas' (2000) estimate of the welfare cost of inflation. But, to make sure that the patterns appearing in Figure 2 are real and not optical illusions and to sharpen the quantitative estimate of the welfare cost of inflation implied by the recent behavior of money demand, the next section presents some more formal statistical results.
... and the Recent Behavior of Money Demand
While Lucas' (2000) focus on a long historical time series extending back to the start of previous century requires the use of annual data, the focus here on the post-1980 period allows for the use of readily-available quarterly figures, again as described below in the Appendix. The money-income ratio is measured by dividing the sweep-adjusted M1 money stock, the M1RS aggregate referred to above, by nominal GDP. And since the Federal Reserve discontinued its reported series for the six-month commercial paper rate in 1997, the threemonth U.S. Treasury bill rate serves instead as the measure of r; in any case, U.S. Treasury bills come closer to matching the risk-free, nominally-denominated bonds that serve as an an alternative store of value in theoretical models of money demand.
Following most of the empirical literature on U.S. money demand since Hafer and Jansen (1991) and Hoffman and Rasche (1991) , the econometric analysis of these data revolves around the ideas of nonstationarity and cointegration introduced by Engle and Granger (1987) . Specifically, a finding that the semi-log specification (2) describes a cointegrating relationship linking two nonstationary variables, the money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate, coupled with a finding that the log-log specification (1) fails to describe the same sort of relationship, provides formal statistical evidence supporting the more casual impressions gleaned from visual inspection of Figure 2 that the semi-log form offers a better fit to the post-1980 data.
Note that these statistical tests, which check first for nonstationarity in and then for cointegration between the variables ln(m) and ln(r) in (1) and the variables ln(m) and r in (2), require one to adopt a somewhat schizophrenic view of those data since, in a linear statistical framework, the analysis of (1) requires ln(r) to follow an autoregressive process with a unit root, while the same analysis of (2) requires r to follow an autoregressive process with a unit root. Bae (2005) helps to resolve this schizophrenia by providing a more detailed discussion of the case in which both (1) and (2) can be estimated under the common assumption that r follows an autoregressive process with a unit root, with (1) viewed as a nonlinear relationship between ln(m) and r and (2) viewed as a linear relationship between the same two variables. The analysis here, by contrast, follows Anderson and Rasche (2001) by putting the two competing specifications on equal footing ex-ante, treating both as linear relationships linking ln(m) to ln(r) in one case and ln(m) to r in the other. where the null hypothesis of a unit root in the error can be rejected, then either (1) or (2) represents a cointegrating relationship: a stationary linear combination of two nonstationary variables. Table 2 displays results associated with these Phillips-Ouliaris tests: the intercept and slope coefficientsα andβ from a linear regression of the form (1) or (2), the slope coeffi-cientρ from a regression of the error term from (1) or (2) on its own lagged value (without a constant, since the error has mean zero), the conventional t-statistic for the null hypothesis of no cointegration (ρ = 1), and the Phillips-Perron statistic Z t for values of the Newey-West Table 3 complements Table 2 by reporting results from Johansen's (1991) test for cointegration, again applied first to ln(m) and ln(r) and then to ln(m) and r. As described by Hamilton (1994, Ch.20 Table 3 shows, for each pair of variables and for each value of p ranging from 2 through 9 (implying 1 through 8 lags when the VAR(p) in levels is written in error-correction form in first differences), the maximum eigenvalue λ 1 computed when evaluating the model's likelihood function using Johansen's algorithm, and the associated maximum eigenvalue statistic LR = −T ln(1 − λ 1 ), a likelihood ratio statistic for testing the null of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration. Since the cointegrating vector in (1) or (2) has a constant term, the critical values for LR appear under the heading "Case 2" in Hamilton's (1994, p.768) Table B .11.
Again, the results point to the semi-log specification (2) as providing a better description of the post-1980 data. The test statistics shown in Table 3 The OLS estimates of the intercept and slope coefficient reported for the semi-log specification in Table 2 imply values of B = 0.1686 and ξ = 1.7944 in (2). Plugging these values into the corresponding formula (4) for Bailey's (1956) welfare cost measure and assuming, as above, that the steady-state real interest rate equals three percent, so that r = 0.03 corresponds to zero inflation, r = 0.05 corresponds to two percent annual inflation, and r = 0.13 corresponds to ten percent annual inflation, yields an estimate of only 0.01 percent of income for the cost of pursuing a policy of price stability as opposed to the Friedman (1969) rule, an estimate of 0.04 percent of income for the cost of two percent inflation, and an estimate of 0.22 percent of income for the cost of ten percent inflation. These welfare cost estimates lie far below those computed by Lucas (2000) and bring the analysis fill circle, back to Fig These results suggest that the Federal Reserve's current policy, which generates low but still positive rates of inflation, provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to Friedman's (1969) deflationary rule for a zero nominal interest rate. Before closing, however, it should be emphasized that these welfare cost estimates account only for the money demand distortion brought about by positive nominal interest rates. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) demonstrate that, in general equilibrium, other marginal decisions can also be distorted when inflation rises, impacting on both the level and growth rate of aggregate output, while Feldstein (1997) argues that the interactions between inflation and a tax code that is not completely indexed can add substantially to the welfare cost of inflation. To the extent that these additional sources of inefficiency remain present in the post-1980 U.S. economy, there will of course be larger gains to reducing inflation below its current low level.
Appendix: Data Sources
The annual data displayed in , Table 3 , Columns 3 and 10) and come, originally, from Friedman and Schwartz (1970 ) for 1915 -1946 and Rasche (1987 , 1990 ) for 1947 -1958 . Notes: Each panel reportsμ andρ, the intercept and slope coefficient from an ordinary least squares regression of the variable on a constant and its own lag, together with t, the t-statistic associated with null hypothesis of ρ = 1, and Z t , the Phillips-Perron statistic corrected for autocorrelation in the regression error, computed using the Newey-West standard error of its variance for various values of the lag truncation parameter q. The critical values for Z t are reported by Hamilton (1994, Table B.6, p.763) : −2.58 (10 percent), −2.89 (5 percent), and −3.51 (1 percent). log-log demand semi-log money demand U.S. Data, 1990 -1979 U.S. Data, 1980 
